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About the Geiger Gibson / RCHN Community Health Foundation Research 
Collaborative 
 
The Geiger Gibson Program in Community Health Policy, established in 2003 and 
named after human rights and health center pioneers Drs. H. Jack Geiger and Count 
Gibson, is part of the School of Public Health and Health Services at The George 
Washington University. It focuses on the history and contributions of health centers and 
the major policy issues that affect health centers, their communities, and the patients 
that they serve. 
 
The RCHN Community Health Foundation, founded in October 2005, is a not-for-profit 
foundation whose mission is to support community health centers through strategic 
investment, outreach, education, and cutting-edge health policy research. The only 
foundation in the country dedicated to community health centers, the Foundation builds 
on health centers’ 40-year commitment to the provision of accessible, high quality, 
community-based healthcare services for underserved and medically vulnerable 
populations. The Foundation’s gift to the Geiger Gibson program supports health center 
research and scholarship. 
 
Additional information about the Research Collaborative can be found online at 
www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/ggprogram or at rchnfoundation.org.  
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Executive Summary  
 
 On March 31, 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
released proposed regulations implementing the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP). The thrust of the MSSP is to promote savings to Medicare as well as the 
greater clinical integration of health care through incentive payments to accountable 
care organizations (ACOs) that meet Medicare standards for structure, performance, 
and health care outcomes. The effort to spur greater clinical integration through the 
MSSP was part of a broader set of reforms contained in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
whose aim was to improve health care quality and efficiency. Among these reforms is 
an $11 billion investment in community health centers, known as federally qualified 
health centers (FQHCs) under the Medicare program. In 2009, health centers served 
nearly 19 million low-income patients, including 1.4 million Medicare beneficiaries. By 
law, health centers must provide comprehensive primary health care while also serving 
as gateways to a full range of necessary care, including inpatient and specialty care.  
Federal data on health center services show that primary care represents 98.2 percent 
of all health care furnished by FQHCs.  
 
Despite the broad aims of the ACA, CMS’ proposed rule bars participation by 
health center-formed ACOs.  Furthermore, while the rule permits health centers to be 
ACO participants, it also prohibits the assignment of Medicare patients to ACOs for 
shared savings purposes. Despite the absence of any legal barriers to FQHC 
participation in the statute, CMS bases this exclusionary policy on the fact that the 
FQHC payment method, which consists of a bundled payment for all primary health 
care services furnished by FQHC staff, does not allow the agency to identify which 
procedures are furnished by physicians, whose presence in care provision is a 
requirement of the ACO statute. In medically underserved communities, however, 
health care teams are essential because of the severe shortage of physicians; 
furthermore, FQHCs use health care teams to ensure comprehensive care. 
 
CMS policy has the potential to produce a series of downstream consequences, 
most notably, the systemic exclusion of the poorest and most underserved patients from 
the benefits of ACOs and the disincentivization of meaningful FQHC affiliation 
agreements with hospitals and specialty groups participating in ACOs. The exclusion of 
Medicare FQHC patients comes at a time when health centers have experienced 
explosive growth in the number of Medicare patients served -- a doubling of patients 
over the past decade, even as the number of low-income Medicare beneficiaries grew 
by less than 10% nationwide.   
 
 The ACO statute provides the Secretary with the discretion to interpret the 
statute’s assignment rule to recognize physicians as providers of health care regardless 
of whether they furnish health care directly or as part of health care teams. Although 
technical issues will arise in designing a shared savings methodology for health care 
team arrangements that rely on bundled payments, this challenge ultimately pales 
alongside the implications of excluding FQHC Medicare patients from the potential 
benefits of ACO practice. 
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Introduction  
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) establishes a “Medicare 
Shared Savings Program”1 (MSSP). The purpose of the program is to improve health 
care by rewarding certain types of provider collaborations -- known under the law as 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) -- that are expected to control costs while 
improving quality.2 Experts have identified ACOs as an important step forward in 
achieving greater efficiency and quality in health care.3 Over time, ACO formation is 
expected to become a major feature of the U.S. health care landscape, not only for 
Medicare but for other sources of coverage such as Medicaid, CHIP, employer-
sponsored health plans, and ultimately, qualified health plans (QHPs) sold in state 
health insurance Exchanges. For this reason, the formation of ACOs is a matter of great 
importance to the future of health care financing and access generally. Indeed, ACO 
formation is a focus of the federal agencies that regulate competition within the health 
care system as a whole.4 
 
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency 
that oversees the MSSP, the program’s aims are to foster “(1) better health care for 
individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) lower growth in expenditures.”5 By 
promoting clinical integration through ACO formation and compensation, the ACA 
reflects longstanding recognition of integration as central to improving the quality and 
cost-effectiveness of health care.6 Congress’ decision to spur the formation of such 
entities through creation of the MSSP comes at a critical time in U.S. health care, as 
health care costs continue to rise far faster than the general rate of inflation and quality 
measures continue to lag well behind those of other nations.  
 
The use of Medicare payment incentives to spur ACO formation was part of a 
broader set of health care quality and efficiency reforms contained in the ACA. Chief 
among these other reforms was an $11 billion investment over the FY 2011-2015 time 
period in the expansion of community health centers (known under Medicare and 
Medicaid as federally qualified health centers, or FQHCs) in order to reach a far greater 
number of rural and urban medically underserved communities, in preparation for the 
coverage expansions due to take place in 2014. By law, health centers must affiliate 
with other health care providers in order to promote health care quality and continuity 
                                                 
1 SSA §1899 (A)as added by PPACA §3022 
2 §1899(a)(1)(A) 
3 MedPAC, 2009 Report to Congress, Ch. 2 http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/jun09_CH02.pdf (Accessed 
April 9, 2011) 
4 See, e.g., FTC/DOJ Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (Notice with Comment Period) 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2011/03/110331acofrn.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2011) 
5 76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19531 (April 7, 2011) 
6 Clinical integration as a key aspect of health care quality improvement was recognized as early as the 
1933 Report of the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC402728/pdf/canmedaj00128-0076.pdf (Accessed April 9, 
2011) 
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and access to medically necessary inpatient and specialty care.7 Thus, viewed through 
the wider lens of the ACA as a whole, it is evident that Congress sought to maximize 
clinical integration across the health care system, in medically underserved 
communities and elsewhere, through a combination of incentives and investments. In 
the case of health centers, Congress’ vision was not simply to make primary health care 
more accessible but also to assure that new primary care access points would serve as 
gateways to comprehensive, high quality health care for medically underserved 
populations. Because the purpose of the MSSP is to spur the types of integration that in 
turn generate patient and population health improvements, health center patients in 
particular stand to gain from this policy advance. 
 
Among the nearly 19 million medically underserved patients served by health 
centers in 2009 were nearly 1.4 million Medicare beneficiaries. Data from the Uniform 
Data System (UDS), which collects information on all federally-funded health centers, 
indicates that health center patients are overwhelmingly low income; more than 71% 
have family incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level. While there exist no data 
on the specific income characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries served by health 
centers (the UDS provides information about patient income information separately from 
information about insurance coverage), it is safe to assume that as residents of 
medically underserved communities, Medicare patients resemble other patients in their 
depressed economic circumstances.  
 
How the CMS Proposed Rule Addresses Medicare Patients Served by Health 
Centers  
 
Despite the ACA’s overall emphasis on clinical quality improvement, the 
Congressional investment in health centers, and, as CMS notes, FQHCs’ “critical role in 
the health care system,”8 the proposed rule effectively places the potential benefits of 
ACOs out of reach of medically underserved patients. The rule does so by not only 
barring participation in the MSSP by health center-formed ACOs,9 but also by 
disincentivizing ACOs from including health centers because of its prohibition of the 
assignment of FQHC Medicare patients to ACOs for shared savings purposes. 
 
Barring health center-formed ACOs from participation in the MSSP: Nothing in 
the statute directly addresses the question of which ACO entities can participate in the 
MSSP. Indeed, the statute states simply that “groups of providers of services and 
suppliers meeting criteria specified by the Secretary may work together to manage and 
coordinate care for Medicare-fee-for-service beneficiaries through an accountable care 
organization.”10 Thus, the issue is left to the discretion of the Secretary. But the 
proposed rule forbids participation by FQHC-formed ACOs,11 allowing access by 
                                                 
7 Sara Rosenbaum et. al., Assessing and Addressing Legal Barriers to Clinical Integration Among 
Community Health Centers,” (Commonwealth Fund, 2011) [forthcoming] 
8 76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19538. 
9 Id.  
10 SSA §§1899(A)(1)(A) as added by PPACA §3022. 
11 76 Fed. Reg. 19538. 
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FQHCs (as well as rural health clinics, or RHCs) only if they participate in ACOs that are 
permitted under the rule to be part of the MSSP.12  
 
Barring inclusion of FQHC Medicare patients in ACOs for shared savings 
purposes: Furthermore, inclusion of health centers in ACOs is disincentivized because 
the proposed rule bars registered FQHC Medicare patients from being assigned to the 
ACO in which a health center participates.  
 
Both policies – barring participation by FQHC-formed ACOs and barring the 
inclusion of Medicare FQHC patients – are the result of CMS’ position that for purposes 
of shared savings, only those patients who receive care from physicians may be 
counted. Reflecting the severe shortage of physicians in the communities in which they 
operate, health centers use primary care teams; moreover, in furtherance of the 
Medicare statute’s FQHC provisions, health centers are paid on an all-inclusive 
encounter rate basis. Paradoxically, these two key factors, the shortage of physicians 
and Medicare’s use of a bundled payment approach to pay FQHCs – the very payment 
approach encouraged under the ACA, – mean, according to CMS, that it is not possible 
to determine whether a Medicare FQHC patient has received any particular covered 
treatment or procedure from a physician.  
 
CMS’ conclusions are based on its interpretation of SSA §1899(c), the provision 
of the ACO statute that addresses patient assignment. In CMS’ view, the statute 
(§§1899(c) and (h)(1)(A)) specifies that the only patients who can be assigned to an 
ACO for shared savings purposes are those whose care is furnished by a participating 
health professional who is a physician. Because the primary care services furnished by 
health centers are paid on a bundled basis, CMS concludes that CHC patients cannot 
be assigned to an ACO because the physician’s precise role in care cannot be 
ascertained.13  Thus, the exclusion of FQHC Medicare beneficiaries ultimately rests on 
the absence of procedure codes under the FQHC payment system. 
  
In order to counter the potential for total exclusion of FQHCs and their patients, 
CMS proposes to create FQHC-related financial incentives.  The first incentive exempts 
“one-sided” ACOs from an otherwise applicable adjustment to their net savings 
thresholds under the shared savings program if 50 percent or more of assigned 
beneficiaries have at least one encounter with a participating FQHC.14 But since 
registered Medicare FQHC patients cannot, under the terms of the CMS rule, count as 
assigned ACO patients, this incentive appears to be linked to use of FQHCs by 
assigned patients (that is, other patients seen by those ACO participating professionals 
whose patients do count). Since assigned patients presumably are already under the 
care of a participating physician, it is unlikely that 50 percent will visit an FQHC as well.   
 
                                                 
12 Id. CMS notes that “[i]t is, however, possible for [FQHCs] to join as an ACO participant in an ACO” that 
has been formed by organizations recognized by CMS as authorized to form an ACO.  
13 76 Fed. Reg. 19538, 19562 
14 42 C.F.R. §425.7(c)(4)(iv) 
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The second incentive comes in the form of an increase of up to 2.5 percentage 
points in the final shared savings rate for a one-sided ACO (and up to 5 percentage 
points in the case of a two-sided ACO) if the ACO includes “a” FQHC.15  However, as 
with the net savings threshold bonus, in order to qualify for this shared savings bonus, 
the ACO’s assigned patients must use the FQHC.  As with the first incentive, use of the 
FQHC by the FQHC’s patients does not count, because Medicare FQHC patients are 
not considered assigned.  Again, it is doubtful that patients under the care of 
participating ACO physicians would also receive care from an FQHC.    
 
In sum, while the ACO statute expressly recognizes the eligibility of many clinical 
professionals other than physicians to participate in ACOs, CMS has interpreted the 
provisions of the assignment statute to preclude assignment of patients to ACOs other 
than those for whom care is provided by a physician. Because medically underserved 
communities heavily depend on the use of health care teams that include a full range of 
health care professionals (a practice encouraged under the broader provisions of the 
ACA), the proposed rule effectively excludes patients whose communities lack primary 
care physicians and that depend on health care teams to bridge this shortage.  
 
Despite CMS’ express acknowledgment of the quality of health center services 
and their “critical” role in health care, the rule thus achieves a result that effectively 
excludes all patients served by one of Medicare’s most important sources of primary 
health care for medically underserved populations. Patients of both FQHCs and RHCs 
are adversely affected by this result, as are those under the care of nurse-managed 
clinics and other practice arrangements that rely on primary health care professionals 
other than physicians. Although CMS attempts to fashion an incentive to overcome the 
impact of its interpretation, the incentive operates only in relation to assigned patients; 
by definition, this incentive therefore excludes all FQHC Medicare patients.  
 
Who Are the Medicare Patients Served by Health Centers? 
 
 Health centers play a considerable – and growing – role in caring for the most at-
risk Medicare patients. Figure 1 shows that Medicare beneficiaries served by FQHCs 
are a rapidly growing part of the FQHC patient population. Data from the UDS covering 
the period 1996 - 2009 shows that over this time, the FQHC Medicare patient population 
grew by 124%, with growth concentrated in the 1998 - 2009 time period.  
 
                                                 
15 42 C.F.R. §425.7(c)(7) 
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Several underlying factors may account for this explosive growth. One possible 
explanation is an increase in the number of health centers in operation and in the total 
number of patients served; health centers grew from 686 to 1,131, while the total 
number of patient served grew from 8.1 million to 18.8 million. But the Medicare patient 
increase outstrips the overall patient increase. Another explanation may be a slight rise 
in the number of low-income Medicare beneficiaries generally (Figure 2). Still another 
explanation might be a decline in other sources of primary health care in medically 
underserved communities.16 Yet another explanation might be a change in Medicare 
and Medicaid payment policy under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). The BBA 
authorized state Medicaid programs to cease paying Medicare rates for dually eligible 
beneficiaries. In the wake of the BBA, virtually all states took advantage of this flexibility 
and eliminated Medicare-level payments for dually eligible beneficiaries. Given the fact 
that FQHC Medicare patients are likely to be dually enrolled, a possible cause of the 
growth is that as states ceased Medicare payment practices for dually eligible persons, 
the number of private, dually participating physicians in these communities also 
declined.  
 
                                                 
16 National Association of Community Health Centers, George Washington University, and the Robert 
Graham Center, Access Transformed: Building a Primary Care Workforce for the 21st Century. 2008. 
http://www.nachc.com/client/documents/ACCESS%20Transformed%20full%20report.PDF. 
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Evidence drawn from the Medicare Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
underscores the elevated health risks experienced by low-income individuals dually 
enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. As shown in Figure 3, dual enrollees are over 1.5 
times more likely to experience serious health limitations, more than twice as likely to 
experience fair to poor health, nearly 3 times as likely to experience fair to poor mental 
health, nearly twice as likely to experience diabetes, and over twice as likely to 
experience asthma. Thus, dual enrollees are significantly more likely to experience not 
only worse health, but also worse health arising from conditions whose outcomes can 
be significantly improved through ambulatory care. They are precisely the patients 
whose health outcomes might most improve through health care furnished in clinically 
integrated systems.  
 
  10
 
 
The Potential Downstream Effects of the Proposed Rule  
 
 By excluding health center-formed ACOs from participation, and by excluding 
FQHC Medicare patients from the shared savings program, the proposed rule has the 
potential to trigger a series of serious downstream effects. 
 
1. The rule excludes the poorest beneficiaries with the highest health risks 
 
Paradoxically, the proposed rule specifies that CMS will monitor ACOs to assure 
that they do not attempt to avoid “at risk” beneficiaries,17 defined as “a beneficiary who 
(1) has a high risk score on the CMS-HCC risk adjustment model; (2) is considered high 
cost due to having two or more hospitalizations each year; (3) is dually eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid; (4) has a high utilization pattern; or (5) has had a recent 
diagnosis that is expected to result in increased cost. Dual eligibility is sufficient to 
trigger monitoring for avoidance, and yet by excluding the very primary care providers 
that disproportionately treat dual enrollees, CMS essentially has excluded nearly 1.5 
million FQHC Medicare beneficiaries from the program, as well as many more who 
receive their care through clinical settings that rely on health care teams, such as 
RHCs. As health centers expand, the number of poor beneficiaries excluded from this 
important access and quality initiative will grow.  
 
                                                 
17 42 C.F.R. §425.12(b) 
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2. The rule penalizes medically underserved communities that lack primary care 
physicians, whose residents rely on health care teams and non-physician primary care 
providers  
 
Provision of care through health care teams has been identified as an important 
measure of quality and efficiency; indeed, CMS itself discusses the importance of teams 
in the Preamble to the rule. In medically underserved rural and urban communities the 
use of health care teams and non-physician providers is essential, but the rule 
penalizes their use as a result of the agency’s interpretation of the statute as limiting 
assignment to patients cared for by physicians. This approach to the statute effectively 
forecloses the growth of ACOs in communities that depend on health care teams.  
 
3. The rule disincentivizes health center efforts to affiliate with hospitals and specialty 
practices 
 
 In recent years, health centers have enjoyed major growth in affiliation activities, 
and health center networks have grown as a means of improving quality and efficiency. 
Of particular importance has been the growth in hospital/health center affiliation, both to 
promote a more cost effective form of care for patients who otherwise depend on 
emergency departments, and to improve the quality and continuity of care.  For 
example, Denver Health, which is nationally renowned for the quality of its care,18 
provides much of its care through affiliated, independent FQHCs. To the extent that the 
rule means that Denver Health’s affiliated Medicare FQHC patients cannot be assigned 
to an ACO, the system’s ability to move forward would be adversely affected. 
 
By disincentivizing health center participation in ACOs, either through health 
center-formed ACOs or on an individual basis, the rule threatens to reverse this 
movement toward greater affiliation. The structure of the rule’s FQHC incentive may 
mean that no ACO will be able to claim credit for including an FQHC, since the incentive 
is available only if assigned patients use the FQHC, and FQHC’s patients cannot be 
assigned patients. Ironically, the CMS ACO interpretation coincides with a highly 
important CMS initiative aimed at developing FQHCs into medical homes for Medicare 
beneficiaries. To fully succeed as medical homes, of course, health centers participating 
in the demonstration will need to be able to overcome clinical integration barriers on 
behalf of patients who require specialty and inpatient care. The ACO rule, with its 
shared savings incentive, might have helped health centers build such a continuum of 
care; instead, the rule has the potential to undermine health centers’ ability to find 
partners in care.  
 
4. The rule has implications for the ability of health center patients to be counted in 
other payers’ shared savings programs 
 
 It is widely expected that other payers such as Medicaid, CHIP, and private 
health insurers and employer-sponsored plans will also begin to contract with ACOs on 
                                                 
18 See e.g., Patricia Gabow and Philip Mehler, A Broad And Structured Approach To Improving Patient 
Safety And Quality: Lessons From Denver Health, Health Affairs 30:612-618 (April, 2011) 
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a shared savings basis. Because of Medicare’s enormous influence on the health care 
system, it is likely that these payers will utilize the Medicare ACO rules. Thus, it is 
possible that health center-formed ACOs will be excluded from participation in state 
Medicaid programs and furthermore, that health center patients will be excluded in other 
payers’ shared savings programs. Such a result would be particularly unfortunate in the 
case of Medicaid, because of the importance of quality and efficiency improvements in 
that program. While the terms of the MSSP statute apply only to the Medicare program, 
the reach of the statute’s methodology may ultimately extend much further.  
 
An Alternative Approach to the Proposed Rule 
 
 Ultimately CMS’ interpretation of the statute’s assignment provision drives the 
exclusion of health center patients from the MSSP. Section 1899(c) provides that “[t]he 
Secretary shall determine the appropriate method to assign Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries to an ACO based on their utilization of primary care services provided 
under this title by [a physician].” This section does not require that services be provided 
directly by physicians, but only that physicians “provide” care. There are many ways to 
provide care, and this flexibility is captured by §1899(b)(1)(E) of the statute, which gives 
the Secretary the discretion to designate a broad range of ACOs and ACO participants.  
 
Moreover, although FQHCs have begun to utilize procedure codes as part of 
their Medicare billings, the simple fact is that, according to the publicly-available UDS 
health center reports, 98.2 percent of all medical services provided by health centers in 
2009 were furnished by primary care providers.  To conclude that the absence of 
procedure codes effectively negates the ability of FQHC Medicare patients to gain the 
benefits of ACO formation and operation simply makes no sense. This position also 
overlooks the provisions of the Medicare FQHC statute, which specifies physician 
services as a core element of FQHC coverage and payment, along with the services of 
other members of a health center’s health care team. Regardless of whether care at 
health centers is provided directly by a physician in all cases, physicians are deeply 
involved in the provision of primary care to all patients.   
 
Furthermore, CMS’ de facto insertion of the word “directly” after “provided” under 
its interpretation is at odds with the range of physician practice that is recognized under 
state law. State law recognizes physicians as providers of health care – and 
accountable for the quality of that care – whether they furnish the care directly or 
provide such care by supervising (either directly or indirectly) the activities of other 
health professionals.  
  
To be sure, technical issues arise in fashioning a shared savings methodology 
for use in health care settings in which primary care is furnished by teams and payment 
is bundled.  But this task is hardly insurmountable, and CMS has long been a leader in 
payment innovation. Ultimately, developing such a payment incentive pales alongside 
the long-term consequences of a policy that effectively excludes medically underserved 
patients from participation in a major practice and quality advance.  
